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God cannot be said to enjoy existence, for the existence of God is God himself.
Spinoza, Cogitata Metaphysica (1663)
It has frequently been argued that with the dawn of modernity, phi-
losophers deserted the Boethian notion of eternity. Thus, Stump and 
Kretzmann write:  “In the modern period, with the rejection of the 
medieval synthesis in theology, the notion of eternity, in the special 
sense at issue here, was largely abandoned. Hobbes is still aware of it in 
the Boethian sense ‘as a permanent now,’ but Locke, for example, takes 
eternity to be just an infinity of temporal duration.”1 These claims, 
while broadly correct, are still quite misleading. Indeed, during the 
seventeenth century, an increasing number of philosophers questioned, 
and later deserted, the Boethian notion of eternity.2 In place of it they 
adopted and advocated either the sempiternal (i.e., eternity as existence 
1 E. Stump and N. Kretzmann, “Eternity,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward 
Craig (London: Routledge, 1998), vol. 3, 422– 427.
2 For a discussion of the Boethian and late- Platonic notion of eternity, see the end of 
 chapter 1 above.
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in all times)3 or the new Spinozist conception of eternity.4 Yet the 
Boethian notion was still strongly and broadly present in this period, 
and it could hardly be said that any seventeenth- century philosopher 
was not “aware” of it. Thus, Abraham Cohen de Herrera (c. 1570– 
1635), the major philosophical kabbalist of early seventeenth- century 
Amsterdam, celebrates the Plotinian/ Boethian notion of eternity:
And it should be noted . . . that eternity, as Boethius defines it in his 
Consolation of Philosophy, “is the whole perfect, and simultaneous 
possession of endless life,” and as Plotinus proves in his profound 
treatise on eternity and time, it is infinite life or duration which, 
lacking beginning and end, remains entirely united and in oneness 
and is consequently so stable and fixed that it neither acquires nor 
loses anything. . . . And as the Prince of Tuscan Poets, Torquato 
Tasso, says in his dialogue the Messenger, eternity does not con-
tain a first or last, a before or after, or elements in sequence or in 
motion:  rather it is united and withdrawn into itself, like a very 
placid lake that has no ebb or flow, increase or loss of water.5
As I will soon show, many seventeenth- century figures hesitated and 
oscillated between asserting and questioning the very intelligibility 
of eternity qua tota simul life. Thus, a report on a 1648 conversation 
between Descartes (1596– 1650) and a young theological student, Frans 
Burman (1628– 1679), says that Burman suggested: “But eternity is all 
at once and once and for all” (Sed aeternitas est simul et semel).6 To 
this Descartes disparagingly replied: “That is impossible to conceive of 
3 See Geoffrey Gorham, “Descartes on God’s Relation to Time,” Religious Studies 44 (2008): 414, 
and Luca Bianchi, “Abiding Then: Eternity of God and Eternity of the World from Hobbes to the 
Encyclopédie,” in The Medieval Concept of Time: The Scholastic Debate and Its Reception in Early 
Modern Philosophy, ed. Pasquale Porro (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 453.
4 The epigraph to this chapter is from CM II 1 (G I/ 252/ 7).
5 Abraham Cohen de Herrera, Puerta del Cielo, bk. 5, chap. 4 (Gate of Heaven, trans. Kenneth 
Krabbenhoft [Leiden: Brill, 2002], 150– 151). For the original text of Torquato Tasso (1544– 1595), 
see Tasso, Prose (Milan: Riccardo Ricciardi, 1959), 44.
6 Suárez, too, cites approvingly the Boethian formula in Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae 50.3.6.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Jan 13 2016, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199781874.indd   130 1/13/2016   6:24:40 PM
 Eternity in Early Modern Philosophy 131
[hoc concipi non potest]. It is all at once and once and for all insofar as 
nothing is never added to or taken away from the nature of God. But 
it is not all at once and once for all in the sense that it exists at once 
[simul existit].”7 By the end of the century, Isaac Newton (1642– 1727) 
pronounced that the Boethian notion was plainly unintelligible: “The 
human race is prone to mystery, and holds nothing quite so holy and 
perfect as what cannot be understood [quod intelligi non potest]. Yet 
in the conception of God this is dangerous, and conduces to the rejec-
tion of his existence…. Let them therefore consider whether it is more 
agreeable to reason that God’s eternity should be all at once [totum 
simul] or that his duration is more correctly designated by the names 
Jehovah and ‘He that was and is and is to come.’ ”8 Newton’s friend 
Samuel Clarke (1675– 1729) quotes sympathetically the Boethian for-
mula in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (1704),9 
yet in his sermons he describes it as unintelligible:  “‘Tis worthy of 
observation, as to the Manner of our conceiving the Eternity of God; 
that the Scholastic Writers have generally described it to be, not a Real 
Perpetual Duration, but One Point or Instant comprehending Eternity, 
and wherein all things are really co- existent at once. But unintelligible 
Ways of Speaking have (I think) never done any Service to Religion. The 
7 Descartes’ Conversation with Burman, trans. John Cottingham (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 
1976), 6 (AT V 149). For discussion of this passage, see Gorham, “Descartes on God’s Relation to 
Time,” 416– 417, and Tad M. Schmaltz, Radical Cartesianism: The French Reception of Descartes 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 200– 201. As I shall later show, on another occa-
sion in the very same year, Descartes expressed agreement with the view that God’s eternity is 
tota simul.
8 J. E. McGuire, “Newton on Place, Time and God, An Unpublished Source,” British Journal for 
the History of Science 11 (1978): 121.
9 Samuel Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (and Other Works), ed. Enzio 
Vailati (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), sec. 5, p. 32: “Thus far we can speak intel-
ligibly concerning the eternal duration of the self- existent being, and no atheist can say this is an 
impossible, absurd, or insufficient account. It is, in the most proper and intelligible sense of the 
words, to all the purposes of excellency and perfection interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta 
possesio, the entire and perfect possession of an endless life.” Clarke then quotes the claims of Gassendi 
and Tilloston, who harshly criticize the Boethian formula as unintelligible (33 n. 26). Enzio Vailati, 
Leibniz and Clarke: A Study of Their Correspondence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 20, 
considers these quotes as intimating Clarke’s rejection of Boethius. I tend to think that Clarke is 
genuinely ambivalent about the issue in the Demonstration.
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true Notion of the Divine Eternity does not consist in making past 
things still present, and all things future to be already come.”10 Why 
did Descartes, Newton, and Clarke think the Boethian (or Plotinian) 
formula was an unintelligible mystification? The Boethian formula is 
committed to the simultaneity of God with all times, and to a notion 
of life, or duration, that is “all at once.” But how can duration be all at 
once? Of course, various magnitudes, for example, infinite extension, 
can exist all at once. But if by duration one understands a temporal 
magnitude, the notion of infinite duration existing all at once seems to 
be just as paradoxical and contradictory as the notion of infinite exten-
sion existing completely at one and the same point.
In this chapter I will trace the history of eternity in the early mod-
ern period (roughly 1550– 1750). Modernity seemed to be the autumn 
of eternity. The secularization of European culture provided little sus-
tenance to the concept of eternity with its heavy theological baggage. 
Yet our hero will not leave the stage without an outstanding demon-
stration of its power and temptation. Indeed, in the two centuries of 
early modernity, the concept of eternity played important roles in the 
period’s greatest philosophical systems.
The first part of the chapter concentrates on the debate about 
God’s relation to time. While most of the great metaphysicians of 
the period— Suárez (1548– 1617), Spinoza (1632– 1677), Malebranche 
(1638– 1715), and Leibniz (1646– 1716)— ascribed nontemporal eternity 
to God, a growing number of philosophers conceived God as exist-
ing in time and eternity as having everlasting existence. For Newton, 
Gassendi (1592– 1655), Henry More (1614– 1687), Samuel Clarke, Isaac 
Barrow (1630– 1677), and John Locke (1632– 1704), God’s eternity was 
simply the fact that he always was, is, and will forever be. In the second 
part of the chapter I will examine the concept of eternal truth (aeternae 
veritates or vérités éternelles). Though this concept has a long history, it 
became far more central in the early modern period with the emergence 
of the closely related notion of the “Law of Nature” (lex naturae).
10 Clarke, The Works (1738), 4 vols. (New York: Garland, 1978), vol. 1, 22. Italics added.
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The third and most extensive part of the chapter will present 
Spinoza’s original understanding of eternity as self- necessitated exis-
tence. Various elements of Spinoza’s notion of eternity can be traced 
back to previous philosophers, but the core of his understanding of 
eternity is original and surprising. For Spinoza, eternity is primarily a 
modal notion, a unique kind of necessity and necessary existence. The 
final part of the chapter will address the reception of Spinoza’s concept 
of eternity in the century following his death. Remarkably, Spinoza’s 
notion of eternity was received positively by figures who would other-
wise sharply criticize his philosophy. Oddly enough, the great “atheist” 
of the early modern period turned out to be the philosophical expert 
on eternity, namely, the very essence of God.
1 God, Time, and Eternity in Early  
Modern Philosophy
Attempting to point out communalities and differences between 
eternity and time, Abraham Cohen Herrera writes:  “The infinite, 
unmoving present is thus like the origin or source of eternity, while 
the bounded, manifold, ongoing, and successive present is the cause of 
time. And in our way of understanding both are measures, that is, eter-
nity is the measure of infinite and abiding being, and time is the measure 
of limited and movable things, except that time measures by diverse 
and successive repetitions many times over, as if it were counting or 
numbering, while eternity measures with a single, unmovable, perma-
nence, unified and focused, in one unmoving moment or indivisible 
instant.”11 Herrera’s dense language seems to assign eternity to only 
one being: “the infinite and abiding being,” which he also calls “the 
First Cause,” that is, God. Other early modern philosophers, however, 
appear to be somewhat less restrictive in terms of the kind of beings 
that enjoy eternity. Both Descartes and Spinoza consider the essences 
11 Herrera, Gate of Heaven, bk. 5, chap. 4 (Krabbenhoft trans., p. 151). Italics added.
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of things— even finite things— eternal.12 In the next part of this chap-
ter I will discuss the “eternal truths,” and when I come to interrogate 
Spinoza, I  will show that he believed that in some sense even finite 
things can be adequately conceived “sub species aeternitatis.” In a very 
different manner George Berkeley (1685– 1753) too would find an eter-
nal abode for all things. Thus, in his Three Dialogues, Berkeley puts 
the following claims in the mouth of Philonous (the dialogues’ char-
acter that represents Berkley’s own views):  “All objects are eternally 
known by God, or which is the same thing, have an eternal existence 
in his mind; but when things before imperceptible to creatures, are 
by a decree of God, made perceptible to them; then they are said to 
begin a relative existence, with respect to created minds.”13 Another 
eternity- related question that engaged early modern philosophers was 
the issue of eternal punishment and reward.14 Finally, we should keep 
in mind that the threat of the unorthodox view of the universe as eter-
nal a parte ante was clearly present, at least at the back of the mind, 
to most early modern thinkers. Yet, in spite of these reservations, it is 
clear that for the early modern philosophers, just as for their medieval 
predecessors, eternity was the kind of existence that belonged primar-
ily to God. If other beings were said to be eternal, either their eternity 
would be considered as inferior to God’s or they would be said to enjoy 
eternity by participating— in one manner or another— in God’s eter-
nity. For this reason, my main focus in this part of the chapter is the 
elucidation of the nature of God’s eternity, that is, eternity in its full 
sense and complete colors.
Thomas Hobbes’s attack on the Boethian notion of divine eter-
nity was part of a more comprehensive assault he launched in the 
12 Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (Fifth Meditation) (AT VII 64). For Spinoza, see 
Ethics, part One, definition 8, explanation, and Part One, proposition 17, scholium (G II/ 63/ 18), 
and CM II 1 (G I/ 239/ 4).
13 George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Pilonous, ed. Jonathan Dancy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), dialogue 3, p. 133. Italics added.
14 See, for example, Nicolas Malebranche, The Search after Truth, trans. Thomas M. Lennon and 
Paul J. Olscamp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 326– 328 and 389.
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Leviathan (1651) against Scholasticism. In a crucial passage in 
 chapter 27 of Leviathan— titled “Of Darkness from Vain Philosophy 
of and Fabulous Traditions”— Hobbes writes:
For the meaning of eternity, they will not have it to be an endless 
succession of time; for then they should not be able to render a rea-
son how God’s will and preordaining of things to come should not 
be before his prescience of the same (as the efficient cause before 
the effect, or agent before the action), nor of many other their bold 
opinions concerning the incomprehensible nature of God. But they 
will teach us, that eternity is the standing still of the present time, 
a nunc- stans (as the Schools call it), which neither they, nor any else 
understand, no more than they would a hic- stans for an infinite 
greatness of place.15
At the beginning of this passage Hobbes suggests an interesting diag-
nosis of the motive for the wide adoption of the Boethian formula 
among the Scholastics, claiming that the alternative view of divine 
eternity as everlasting existence faces the serious objection that if time 
existed before the creation of the world, God’s choice to create the 
world at any specific instant of time would seem to be arbitrary. Before 
creation there seem to be no events, and thus all instants of precre-
ation time should be uniform. But in a uniform time, there cannot be 
a reason to act at t1 rather than t2, since whatever is true about the one 
must be true about the other.16 According to Hobbes, the Scholastics, 
attempting to avoid the danger of rendering God’s actions arbitrary 
and incomprehensible, succumbed to another form of unintelligible 
talk by adopting the contradictory formula of “whole perfect, and 
simultaneous possession of endless life.”
15 Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis:  Hackett, 1994), 461. My discussion of 
Hobbes profited much from Luca Bianchi’s excellent article “Abiding Then.”
16 This kind of argument is most familiar from the Leibniz- Clarke correspondence, though it has 
a much longer history. See Bianchi, “Abiding Then,” 544– 545.
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In his 1656 Elements of Philosophy, Hobbes addresses another argu-
ment that aims to vindicate the Boethian formula by pointing out a 
different problem with the understanding of eternity as everlasting-
ness. Notice that the argument begins with a demonstration address-
ing the everlastingness of the universe and then shifts to the issue of 
the proper understanding of God’s eternity.
For who can commend him that demonstrates thus? “If the world 
be eternal, then an infinite number of days, or other measures of 
time, preceded the birth of Abraham. But the birth of Abraham 
preceded the birth of Isaac; and therefore one infinite is greater than 
another infinite, or one eternal than another eternal; which,” he 
says, “is absurd.” This demonstration is like his, who from this, that 
the number of even numbers is infinite, would conclude that there 
are as many even numbers as there are numbers simply, that is to say, 
the even numbers are as many as all the even and odd together. They, 
which in this manner take away eternity from the world, do they not 
by the same means take away eternity from the Creator of the world? 
From this absurdity therefore they run into another, being forced 
to call eternity nunc stans, a standing still of the present time, or an 
abiding now; and, which is much more absurd, to give to the infi-
nite number of numbers the name of unity. But why should eternity 
be called an abiding now, rather than an abiding then? Wherefore 
there must either be many eternities, or now and then must signify 
the same. With such demonstrators as these, that speak in another 
language, it is impossible to enter into disputation.17
The argument Hobbes employs against the preeternity of the world 
goes back to medieval philosophy and ultimately to John Philoponus.18 
The core idea of the argument is that assuming the world had already 
17 Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy, chap.  26, sec. 1, in Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas 
Hobbes of Malmesbury, 11 vols., ed. William Molesworth (London: J. Bohn, 1839– 45), vol. 1, 413.
18 See Bianchi, “Abiding Then,” 546– 547, and Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation, and the 
Continuum (London: Duckworth, 1983), 210– 231.
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endured for an infinite duration of time, we are bound to get entangled 
in the paradoxes of infinity in which an infinite quantity turns out to be 
equal to its part (which is also infinite). That the whole is greater than 
its part was considered one of the most unshakeable truths for medieval 
and early modern philosophers.19 Thus, if the preeternity of the world 
led necessarily to the violation of this unshakable truth, the assumption 
of preeternity would seem to be refuted. Hobbes’s own contribution to 
this discussion was the note that this refutation of the preeternity of the 
world is just as much a refutation of the preeternity of God, that is, of 
the conception of divine eternity as everlastingness. Here again, Hobbes 
claims, attempting to avoid one absurdity, the Scholastics uncritically 
adopted another absurdity: the Boethian concept of divine eternity.
Hobbes’s own position on the issue of divine eternity was quite deli-
cate, as he openly admitted that we could not understand the notion 
of infinity and infinite time. “But the knowledge of what is infinite 
can never be attained by a finite inquirer. Whatsoever we know that 
are men, we learn it from our phantasms; and of infinite, whether mag-
nitude or time, there is no phantasm at all; so that it is impossible either 
for a man or any other creature to have any conception of infinite.”20 
Not being able to offer an intelligible alterative to the nunc stans con-
ception of divine eternity, Hobbes’s sophisticated polemics against the 
Scholastics and their adoption of the Boethian formula resulted in no 
more than an embarrassing stalemate.
I will turn now to Hobbes’s great contemporary René Descartes 
and look closely at his understanding of divine eternity. I have already 
mentioned Frans Burman’s report that in his 1648 conversation with 
Descartes, Descartes said that the Boethian formula is just “impossible 
19 Early modern philosophers frequently refer to the proposition that “the whole is greater that 
its part” as the stock example of a necessary and evident truth. See Descartes to Mesland, May 
2, 1644 (AT IV 110); Spinoza, Ethics, part Four, proposition 18, scholium (G II/ 222/ 22); and 
Leibniz, “Primary Truths,” in Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, ed. and trans. R. Ariew and D. Garber 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 31.
20 Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy, chap.  26, sec. 1, in Hobbes, English Works, vol. 1, 411– 412. 
Italics added.
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to conceive of.”21 In the very same conversation Descartes is also reported 
as saying:  “We can divide God’s duration into an infinite number of 
parts, even though God himself is not therefore divisible.”22 We might 
thus suspect that Descartes viewed divine eternity as mere everlasting-
ness. Indeed, in the Fifth Meditation we find Descartes writing: “Apart 
from God, there is nothing else of which I am capable of thinking such 
that existence belongs to its essence … and after supposing that one 
God exists, I plainly see that it is necessary that he has existed from eter-
nity and will abide for eternity [ab aeterno extiterit, & in aeternum sit 
mansurus].”23 The wording of the last sentence of this passage seems to 
indicate that Descartes indeed conceived divine eternity as everlasting-
ness, but such a conclusion would be premature. In his 1644 Principles 
of Philosophy he addresses the nature of divine actions. “[God’s] under-
standing and willing does not happen, as in our case, by means of opera-
tions that are in a certain sense distinct one from another; we must rather 
suppose that there is always a single identical and perfectly simple act by 
means of which he simultaneously understands, wills and accomplishes 
everything.”24 The Principles passage presents God’s actions as simultane-
ous, that is, as not having duration. This view still leaves open the pos-
sibility that God’s existence is spread in time. I will turn then to a 1648 
letter in which Antoine Arnauld (1612– 1694) suggests to Descartes that 
human thought too is not successive. “The duration of a permanent and 
highly spiritual thing [rei permanentis & maxime spiritalis], such as the 
mind, is not successive but rather all at once [totam simul] (as is certainly 
the case with the duration of God).”25 To this Descartes replies: “Even 
if no bodies existed, it could still not be said that that the duration of 
the human mind was entirely simulatenous [tota simul] like the duration 
of God [quemadmodum duration Dei]; because our thoughts display a 
21 Descartes’ Conversation with Burman, 6 (AT V 149).
22 Descartes’ Conversation with Burman, 6 (AT V 149).
23 AT VII 68. Italics added.
24 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy 1.23 (AT IXB 14| CSM I 201). Italics added.
25 Arnauld to Descartes, June 3, 1648 (AT V 188).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Jan 13 2016, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199781874.indd   138 1/13/2016   6:24:40 PM
 Eternity in Early Modern Philosophy 139
succession which cannot be found in the divine thoughts.”26 We have 
thus two texts of Descartes, both dated 1648: in the letter to Arnauld he 
affirms that God endures “all at once”; in the conversation with Burman 
he claims that this very view is unintelligible.
We find a similar oscillation between affirmation and rejection 
of the Boethian formula in Nicolas Malebranche’s Dialogues on 
Metaphysics and on Religion (1688). Attempting to explain divine 
immensity, Theodore, the Malebranchian spokesman in the dialogue, 
suggests the following analogy:
Created extension is to the divine immensity what time is to eter-
nity. All, bodies are extended in the immensity of God, as all times 
succeed one another in His eternity. God is everything he is without 
succession in time. In His existence there is neither past nor future; 
everything is present, immutable, and eternal. . . . God created the 
world, but the volition to create is not past. God will change the 
world, but the volition to change is not in the future. The will of 
God which was and will be is an eternal and immutable act whose 
effects change without there being a change in God. In a word, God 
was not, He will not be, but He is. We could say that God was in 
past time; but He was then everything He will be in future time. 
For His existence and duration, if it permitted to use that term, is 
completely in eternity, and completely in every passing moment of 
His eternity. Likewise, God is not partly in heaven and partly in 
earth. He is completely whole in his immensity, and completely in 
all the bodies which are locally extended in his immensity.27
Theodore’s explanation of divine eternity is very close to the Boethian 
formula, as he denies any succession in God and stresses repeatedly that 
26 Descartes to Arnauld, June 4, 1648 (AT V 193| CSM III 355). Italics added. For a helpful discus-
sion of this passage, see Schmaltz, Radical Cartesianism, 85– 86 and 199– 200.
27 Malebranche, Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion, trans. Nicholas Jolley and David Scott 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), dialogue 8, p. 132. Italics added.
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God exists all at once. Since Theodore is the character representing 
Malebranche’s view, it would seem that Malebranche fully endorsed the 
Boethian formula. Yet the response Malebranche puts in the mouth of 
Aristes— the skeptical disciple of Theodore— presses again the charge 
of unintelligibility or unclarity against the Boethian formula. “It seems 
to me, Theodore, that you are explaining an obscure thing by means of 
another which is not very clear.”28 The analogy Theodore draws between 
divine immensity and divine eternity is not helpful, claims Aristes, 
since divine eternity (which was supposed to help explain immensity) is 
unclear in itself. At this point Theodore responds by noting that Aristes 
granted that God is eternal earlier in the dialogue, and that it is for this 
reason that he (i.e., Theodore) brought the analogy with immensity.29 
However, since Aristes never explained what he understood by divine 
eternity, Theodore’s response appears only partly satisfying.
Less we rashly infer that ambivalence was the only attitude 
toward the Boethian formula among seventeenth- century philoso-
phers, I  stress that one can find unhesitant partisans on both sides 
of the debate. Thus, Father Pierre Gassendi (1592– 1655) rejected the 
Boethian formula in no unclear terms, claiming: “Eternity cannot be 
understood as anything else than perpetual duration … inasmuch as 
it lacks beginning and end,” and placing the blame for the blunder of 
the Boethian formula in Boethius’s reading of the Timaeus.30 On the 
other hand, toward the end of the century, Anne Conway (1631– 1679), 
defended the Boethian formula with equal decisive conviction:
The eternity of creatures is nothing other than an infinity of times 
in which they were and always are and always will be without end. 
28 Malebranche, Dialogues, dialogue 8, p. 132.
29 Malebranche, Dialogues, dialogue 8, p. 133.
30 Gassendi, Opera Omnia in sex tomos divisa, 6  vols. (Lyon:  Laurent Anisson and Jean- 
Baptiste Devenet, 1658); reprinted in facsimile and with an introduction by Tullio Gergory 
(Stuttgart:  Friedrich Frohmann, 1964), vol. 1, p.  225b. The English translation is quoted from 
Antonia Lolordo, Pierre Gassendi and the Birth of Early Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 127. See her helpful discussion there.
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Nevertheless, this infinity of time is not equal to the infinite eternity 
of God since the divine eternity has no times in it and nothing in it 
can be said to be past or future, but it is always and wholly present. . . . 
And the reason for this is obvious because time is nothing but the 
successive motions or operations of creatures, and if this motion or 
operation should cease, then time itself would cease and the creatures 
themselves would end with time. . . . And since in God there is no 
successive motion or operation toward further perfection because 
he is absolutely perfect, there are no times in God or his eternity. 
Furthermore, because there are no parts in God, there are also no 
times in him since all times have parts and are divisible into infinity.31
Conway’s two fine arguments in defense of Boethius appeared in her 
posthumously published Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern 
Philosophy (1690). At this point in time the tide was growing strongly 
against the Boethian formula. In his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1690), John Locke attempted to explain the nature 
and origin of our idea of eternity. He thus writes: “By being able to 
repeat such Idea of any length of Time, as of a Minute, a Year, or an 
Age, as often as we will in our Thoughts, and adding them one to 
another, without ever coming to the end of such additions, any nearer 
than we can to the end of number, to which we can always add; we 
come by the Idea of Eternity, as the future eternal Duration of our 
Souls, as well as the eternity of that infinite Being which must neces-
sarily have always existed.”32 For Locke, eternity is nothing but infi-
nite duration. Yet, Locke argues, we have no clear idea of eternity, just 
we have no clear idea of infinity of any other kind.
31 Anne Conway, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, ed. Alison P. Coudert 
and Taylor Corse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 13– 14. For an illuminating dis-
cussion of Conway’s understanding of eternity, see Christia Mercer, Exploring the Philosophy of 
Anne Conway, unpublished book manuscript, chap. 4.
32 Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding 2.14.31 (An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975], 196).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Jan 13 2016, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199781874.indd   141 1/13/2016   6:24:40 PM
142 Yitzhak Y. Melamed
Having frequently in our Mouths the Name Eternity, we are apt 
to think we have a positive comprehensive Idea of it, which is as 
much as to say, that there is no part of that Duration which is not 
clearly contained in our Idea. It is true that he that thinks so may 
have a very clear Idea of Duration; he may also have a clear Idea 
of a very great length of Duration; he may also have a clear idea 
of the comparison of that great one with still a greater: But it not 
being possible for him to include in his idea of any Duration, let it 
be as great as it will, the whole extent together of a Duration, where 
he supposes no end, that part of his Idea, which is still beyond the 
Bounds of that large Duration, he represents to his own thoughts, 
is very obscure and undetermined. And hence it is that in Disputes 
and Reasonings concerning Eternity, or any other Infinite, we are 
very apt to blunder, and involve ourselves in manifest absurdities.33
At the very end of the seventeenth century, Pierre Bayle (1647– 1706) 
seemed to epitomize the growing embracement surrounding the 
notion of eternity by stating in his celebrated Dictionnaire (1697) 
that the common Boethian definition of divine eternity “is far more 
incomprehensible than the dogmas of transubstantiation [beaucoup 
plus incomprehensible que le dogme de la Transubstantiation].”34
2 Eternal Truths
In section 48 of the first part of his Principles of Philosophy (1644), 
Descartes writes: “All the objects of our perception we regard either as 
things, or affections of things, or else as eternal truths [aeternas veri-
tates] which have no existence outside our thought.”35 But what are pre-
cisely these “eternal truths” that have no existence outside our mind? 
33 Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding 2.29.15 (Nidditch ed., p. 369).
34 Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, 5th ed. (Amsterdam: P. Brunel, 1740), vol. 4, 
531 n. H. See Bianchi, “Abiding Then,” 558.
35 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy 1.48 (AT VIIIA 22| CSM I 208). Italics added.
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After listing the classes of things and their affections, Descartes turns 
to the category of eternal truths:
It is not possible— or indeed necessary— to give a similar list of eternal 
truths.
Everything in the preceding list we regard either as a thing or as a 
quality or mode of a thing. But when we recognize that it is impos-
sible for anything to come from nothing, the proposition Nothing 
comes from nothing is regarded not as a really existing thing [res ali-
qua existens], or even as a mode of a thing, but as an eternal truth 
which resides within our mind. Such truths are termed common 
notions or axioms [communis notion sive axioma]. The following 
are examples of this class:  It is impossible for the same thing to be 
and not to be at the same time; What is done cannot be undone; He 
who thinks cannot but exist while he thinks; and countless others. It 
would not be easy to draw up a list of all of them; but nonetheless 
we cannot fail to know them when the occasion for thinking about 
them arises, provided that we are not blinded by preconceived 
opinions.36
Earlier in the Principles, Descartes explained that the common notions 
are notions “from which the mind constructs various proofs; and for as 
long as it attends to them, it is completely convinced of their truth.”37 
It seems thus that the eternal truths are just the most foundational 
principles of logic, mathematics, and metaphysics. Descartes’s charac-
terization of the eternal truths as “residing within our mind,”38 and 
apparently not requiring the existence of anything (but God, as I will 
shortly show), places them in contrast to Descartes’s understanding of 
laws of nature (leges naturae), the regularities that God established in 
36 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy 1.49 (AT VIIIA 23– 24| CSM I 209).
37 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy 1.13 (AT VIIIA 9| CSM I 197). See Descartes, Rules for the 
Direction of the Mind, rule 12 (AT X 419).
38 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy 1.49 (AT VIIIA 23| CSM I 209).
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matter.39 Still, what is most striking about Descartes’s conception of 
both eternal truths and laws of nature is that he takes both to be freely 
chosen by God. Thus, in a letter of April 15, 1630, to his friend Father 
Marin Mersenne (1588– 1648), Descartes writes:
The mathematical truths which you call eternal have been laid 
down by God and depend on him entirely no less than the rest of his 
creatures. Indeed, to say that these truths are independent of God 
is to talk of him as if he were Jupiter or Saturn and to subject him 
to the Styx and Fates. Please do not hesitate to assert and proclaim 
everywhere that it is God who lays down laws in his kingdom. . . .  
It will be said that if God has established these truths he could 
change them as a king changes his laws. To this the answer is: Yes 
he can, if his will can change.40
These claims must have surprised Mersenne, as the common Scholastic 
position, as formulated by Aquinas, restricted divine omnipotence to 
the realm of the logically possible.41 When Mersenne asks Descartes 
by what kind of causality God creates the eternal truth, Descartes does 
not seem to budge: “You ask me by what kind of causality God estab-
lished the eternal truths. I reply: by the same kind of causality as he 
created all things, that is to say, as their efficient and total cause.”42
39 See Descartes’s early work The World [Le monde], chap. 7 (AT XI 37).
40 AT I  145– 146| CSM III 23. Just a few weeks later, on May 6, 1630, Descartes writes to 
Mersenne: “If men really understood the sense of their words they could never say without blas-
phemy that the truth of anything is prior to the knowledge that God has of it” (AT I 149| CSM 
III 24). The target of Descartes’s criticism seems to be Francisco Suárez’s claim that eternal truths 
“are not true because they are known by God, but rather they are thus known because they are 
true” (Suárez, Metaphysical Disputation 31, sec. 12.40. For an insightful study of Suárez’s position 
that argues that Descartes’s view is just an amended version of Suárez, see Amy Karofsky, “Suárez’ 
Doctrine of Eternal Truths,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2001): 46.
41 “God is unable to make opposites exist in the same subject at the same time and in the same 
respect… . Since the principles of certain sciences— of logic, geometry, and arithmetic for 
instance— are derived exclusively from the formal principle of things, upon which their essence 
depends, it follows that God cannot make the contraries of those principles.” Aquinas, Summa 
Contra Gentiles 2.25.12 and 14. See Anthony Kenny, The God of the Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1979), 17.
42 Descartes to Mersenne, May 27, 1630 (AT I 151– 152).
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The very intelligibility of the claim that God can change the laws 
of logic was put under close scrutiny by both Descartes’s contempo-
raries and modern scholars.43 The issue comes up repeatedly in the 
Objections and Replies, which Descartes appended to his Meditations 
(1641). In the Sixth Set of Replies, more than a decade after the 1630 
letter to Mersenne, Descartes still insists that God’s will is completely 
indifferent in deciding which eternal truths to create.44 Nothing can 
make God even incline toward one law rather than the other.
If anyone attends to the immeasurable greatness of God he will 
find it manifestly clear that there can be nothing whatsoever 
[nihil omnino esse posse] which does not depend on him. This 
applies not just to everything that subsists, but to all order, every 
law, and every reason for anything’s being true or good [nullamve 
rationem veri & boni]. If this were not so, then . . . God would not 
have been completely indifferent with respect to the creation of 
what he did in fact create. If some reason for something’s being 
good had existed Prior to his preordination, this would have 
determined God to prefer those things which it was best to do. . . .  
Hence we should not suppose that eternal truths “depend on the 
human intellect or on other existing things”; they depend on God 
alone, who, as the supreme legislator, has ordained [instituit] them 
from eternity.45
43 For a fascinating and highly influential study of this issue, see Harry Frankfurt, “Descartes on 
the Creation of the Eternal Truths,” Philosophical Review 86 (1977): 36– 57. For a recent helpful 
overview of the current state of the debate, see David Cunning, “Descartes Modal Metaphysics,” in 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, spring 2014 ed., ed. Edward N. Zalta, sec. 3.
44 There is a major tension between Descartes’s insistence here on God’s complete indifference as 
condition for divine freedom and his claims in the Fourth Meditation: “In order to be free, there is 
no need for me to be inclined both ways; on the contrary, the more I incline in one direction— either 
because I clearly understand that reasons of truth and goodness point that way, or because of a 
divinely produced disposition of my inmost thoughts— the freer is my choice. Neither divine grace 
nor natural knowledge ever diminishes freedom; on the contrary, they increase and strengthen it. 
But the indifference I feel when there is no reason pushing me in one direction rather than another is 
the lowest grade of freedom; it is evidence not of any perfection of freedom, but rather of a defect in 
knowledge or a kind of negation.” Fourth Meditation (AT VII 57– 58| CSM II 40). Italics added.
45 Sixth Set of Replies (AT VII 436). Italics added.
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An interesting objection to these bold claims of Descartes was raised 
by Pierre Gassendi, who argued that Descartes’s view of the eternal 
truths compromises the uniqueness of God’s eternity by making 
created beings— the eternal truths— just as eternal as God.46 At this 
point, one could expect Descartes to resort to the familiar strategy of 
making created things eternal only in a secondary and inferior sense.47 
Instead, Descartes seems to bite the bullet and insist that the eternal 
truths are just as eternal as God himself.
You say that you think it is “very hard” to propose that there is 
anything immutable and eternal apart from God. You would be 
right to think this if I was talking about existing things, or if I was 
proposing something as immutable in the sense that its immutabil-
ity was independent of God. But just as the poets suppose that the 
Fates were originally established by Jupiter, but that after they were 
established he bound himself to abide by them, so I do not think 
that the essences of things, and the mathematical truths which we 
can know concerning them, are independent of God. Nevertheless 
I do think that they are immutable and eternal, since the will and 
decree of God willed and decreed that they should be so. Whether 
you think this is hard or easy to accept, it is enough for me that it 
is true.48
Descartes’s reply to Gassendi seems to admit that were he speaking of 
eternal truths as “existing things” (de re existente), Gassendi’s objection 
would be in place. Indeed, at the beginning of my discussion I showed 
that in Principles 1.48, Descartes explicitly refers to eternal truths as 
46 Fifth Set of Objections (AT VII 319).
47 There is some evidence that Descartes considered eternal truths as merely everlasting. See Fifth 
Set of Replies (AT VII 381): “Since eternal truths are always the same [eadem semper], it is right to 
call them immutable and eternal” (AT VII 381| CSM II 262). See Gorham, “Descartes on God’s 
Relation to Time,” 423, for a discussion of this passage.
48 Fifth Set of Replies (AT VII 380| CSM II 261).
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a class distinct from both things and the affections of things. On the 
other hand in the First Set of Replies Descartes counters Johannes 
Caterus’s claim that “an eternal truth does not require a cause,” by 
insisting that an eternal truth, just like any other idea, “surely needs 
a cause enabling it to be conceived.”49 Thus, eternal truths are not just 
nothingness that does not require a cause. Just like the Cartesian God, 
(Cartesian) eternal truths are mental items, and just like God, eternal 
truths are eternal. For Gassendi, such a situation threatens the unique-
ness of God. Of course, Descartes would claim that eternal truths do 
not exist outside the human mind, while God does. But since God 
exists outside the human mind as another (infinite) mind, Gassendi 
could easily reply to Descartes that eternal truths exist outside my 
mind, in the minds of other people. The main point of Gassendi is that 
unlike many of his medieval predecessors, Descartes does not locate 
the eternal truths in God’s mind;50 rather, he considers them as created 
beings. Granting full- fledged eternity to a created being may indeed be 
as a small but crucial step on a path leading to idolatry.
Before I  turn to discuss Spinoza’s new conception of eternity in 
the next section, let me briefly point out Spinoza’s radical reconcep-
tualization of the notion of eternal truth. Descartes’s view of God as 
legislating— like a king— the eternal truths and the laws of nature was 
primarily an object of ridicule for Spinoza, who considered such views 
as gross and childish instances of anthropomorphic thinking. Thus, 
in the scholium to the third proposition of Part Two of the Ethics, 
Spinoza writes:  “By God’s power ordinary people [Vulgus] under-
stand God’s free will and his right over all things which are, things 
which on that account are commonly considered to be contingent. For 
they say that God has the power of destroying all things and reduc-
ing them to nothing. Further, they very often compare God’s power 
49 First Set of Objections (AT VII 93| CSM II 70). The aim of Caterus’s claim was to undermine 
the Cartesian proof of the existence of God in the Third Meditation.
50 See Kenny, God of the Philosophers, 15– 17, who stresses this point.
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with the power of Kings.”51 In his Theological Political Treatise (1670) 
Spinoza draws a distinction between eternal truths and laws of nature 
that is very different from Descartes’s (and indeed aims at eradicating 
Descartes’s claim that God freely creates the eternal truths). In the fol-
lowing passage Spinoza explains the process by which a law of nature 
turns into an eternal truth: “As for the divine natural law whose highest 
precept we have said is to love God, I have called it a law in the sense in 
which philosophers apply the word ‘law’ [legem] to the common rules 
of nature according to which all things happen…. Divine command-
ments seem to us like decrees or enactments only so long as we are ignorant 
of their cause. Once we know this, they immediately cease to be edicts, and 
we accept them as eternal truths, not as decrees.”52 In describing natural 
regularities as laws, we conceive these regularities as expressions of the 
arbitrary will of the master of the universe. We are confident in the 
necessity of these regularities, yet being ignorant of their causes and not 
being able to explain their necessity, we conceive of them as decrees of a 
most powerful agent. One can see this analysis as Spinoza’s attempt to 
understand the psychological processes that led people like Descartes 
to view God as freely legislating the laws of nature. In the above passage 
Spinoza refrains from judging this form of anthropomorphic thinking 
and only adds that the ignorance (of the causes of natural regularities) 
that is the ground of the conception of God as legislator is corrigible. 
Once we learn the causes of natural regularities they no longer appear 
arbitrary, and thus we no longer conceive of them as laws. Once we fully 
understand the causal and explanatory ancestries of these regularities 
we conceive of them as eternal truth. The more we learn the causes of 
51 Unless otherwise marked, all references to the Ethics, the early works of Spinoza, and Letters 
1- 29 are to Curley’s translation: The Collected Works of Spinoza. Vol. 1. Edited and translated by 
Edwin Curley. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). In references to the other letters of 
Spinoza I have used Shirley’s translation: Spinoza, Complete Works, translated by Samuel Shirley 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002). I have relied on Gebhardt’s critical edition (Spinoza Opera, 4 vol-
umes (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Verlag, 1925)) for the Latin text of Spinoza.
52 Spinoza, Theological Political Treatise, trans. Michael Silverthorne and Jonathan Israel 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), chap. 16, n. 34 (G III/ 264). Italics added.
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laws of nature, the closer we are to conceiving them as fully rational and 
transparent eternal truths.
Throughout the Theological Political Treatise, Spinoza brings several 
examples of eternal truths that were conceived by various biblical fig-
ures as laws or edicts.53 I  will conclude my brief discussion of eternal 
truths with a striking passage in which Spinoza points out that even the 
existence of God— an obvious eternal truth, for Spinoza— could be mis-
conceived as an edict. The occasion for this misconception, according to 
Spinoza, was none other than God’s revelation on Mount Sinai.
It is for the same reason too, namely deficiency of knowledge [defec-
tum cognitionis], that the Ten Commandments were law [lex] only 
for the Hebrews. Since they did not know [noverant] the existence 
of God as an eternal truth, i.e., that God exists and that God alone 
is to be adored, they had to understand it as decrees [legem]. If God 
had spoken to them as directly without the use of any physical 
means, they would have perceived this same thing not as an edict 
[legem] but as an eternal truth.54
4 Spinoza on Eternity  
as Self- Necessitated Existence
Spinoza’s philosophy is as bold and original as it is difficult.55 For 
this reason, I will precede my examination of Spinoza’s novel concep-
tion of eternity with a brief exposition of the three building blocks of 
his ontology: substance (substantia), attribute (attributum), and mode 
53 See, for example, Theological Political Treatise, chap. 4 (G III/ 63): “Adam perceived that revela-
tion not as an eternal and necessary truth but rather as a ruling, that is, as a convention that gain or 
loss follows, not from the necessity and nature of the action done, but only from the pleasure and 
absolute command of the prince. Therefore that revelation was a law and God was a kind of legislator 
or prince exclusively with respect to Adam, and only because of the deficiency of his knowledge.”
54 Spinoza, Theological Political Treatise, chap. 4 (G III/ 63).
55 This section of the chapter relies partly on my article “Spinoza’s Deification of Existence,” Oxford 
Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 6 (2012): 75– 104, and my Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance and 
Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 121– 126.
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(modus).56 At the opening of part  1 of the Ethics, Spinoza provides 
the following definitions for substance, attribute, mode, and God 
(Spinoza’s infinite and unique substance):
Definition 3: By substance I understand what is in itself and is con-
ceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require 
the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed.
Definition 4: By attribute I understand what the intellect per-
ceives of a substance, as constituting its essence.
Definition 5: By mode I understand the affections of a substance, 
or that which is in another through which it is also conceived.
Definition 6: By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, 
i.e., a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of 
which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence.
Explanation: I say absolutely infinite, not infinite in its own 
kind; for if something is only infinite in its own kind, we 
can deny infinite attributes of it [NS:57 (i.e., we can conceive 
infinite attributes which do not pertain to its nature)]; but if 
something is absolutely infinite, whatever expresses essence 
and involves no negation pertains to its essence.
Each of these definitions raises numerous interpretative questions 
and has been a source of many scholarly debates. Still, we can get 
the gist of Spinoza’s understanding of substance and mode by not-
ing that Spinoza defines substance as that which is independent both 
ontologically (“in itself ” [in se est]) and conceptually (“is conceived 
through itself [per se concipitur]”), while mode is defined as that 
which is dependent on another both ontologically (“in another” [in 
56 For a close study of Spinoza’s understanding of these three concepts, see my article “The 
Building Blocks of Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance, Attributes, and Modes,” in Della Rocca 
The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza. For a study of the chronological development of Spinoza’s 
understanding of substance and attribute, see my “A Glimpse into Spinoza’s Metaphysical 
Laboratory.”
57 “NS” is a reference to the 1677, Nagelate Schriften, the Dutch translation of Spinoza’s works 
which was published simultaneously with Spinoza’s Opera Posthuma, nine months after his death.
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alio est]) and conceptually (“through which it is also conceived” [per 
quod etiam concipitur].
Both the attributes and the modes are qualities of the substance. 
However, the attributes are the essential qualities of the substance, 
while the modes are nonessential qualities of the substance (i.e., quali-
ties that the substance can gain and lose). Since the attributes are the 
essential qualities of the substance, Spinoza argues that they must 
share the substance’s defining characteristic of being self- conceived (i.e., 
no attribute can be conceived through another attribute).58
Relying on the asymmetric dependence of modes on the substance, 
Spinoza proves that two substances cannot share the same attribute.59 
Relying on the definition of substance as an independent being, 
Spinoza proves that one substance cannot be the cause of another.60 
These three crucial steps— the self- conceivability of attributes, the fact 
the substances (if there are any) cannot share an attribute, and that 
substances are causally isolated— lead Spinoza to the proof that God, a 
substance of infinitely many attributes, must exist,61 and shortly after-
ward to the demonstration that God is the only possible substance.62
Another crucial distinction we should have in mind is between 
what Spinoza calls Natura naturans and Natura naturata. Here are his 
explicit definitions of the two: “By Natura naturans we must under-
stand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, or such attributes 
of substance as express an eternal and infinite essence, i.e. (by P14C1 
and P17C2), God, insofar as he is considered as a free cause. But by 
Natura naturata I understand whatever follows from the necessity of 
God’s nature, or from any of God’s attributes, i.e., all the modes of 
God’s attributes insofar as they are considered as things which are in 
58 See Ethics, Part One, proposition 9, demonstration.
59 See Ethics, Part One, proposition 5, demonstration.
60 See Ethics, Part One, proposition 6, demonstration.
61 See Ethics, Part One, proposition 11, demonstration.
62 See Ethics, Part One, proposition 14, demonstration. For an excellent reconstruction of the entire 
argument (following the steps noted above), see Michael Della Rocca, “Spinoza’s Substance Monism,” in 
Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes, ed. Koistinen and Biro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 11– 37.
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God, and can neither be nor be conceived without God.”63 Roughly 
speaking, Natura naturans is the realm of the essence of substance, 
and its infinitely many attributes, while Natura naturata is the realm 
of the modes, the nonessential qualities that follow from the essence of 
God, the unique and only substance.
With this cursory overview of the foundation of Spinoza’s ontology 
at hand, I can now approach his understanding of eternity. My discus-
sion will focus primarily on Spinoza’s masterwork, the Ethics, though 
occasionally I will also refer to some of his earlier works and letters.
At the beginning of the climactic conclusion of the Ethics, Spinoza 
writes:  “Eternity is the very essence of God insofar as this involves 
necessary existence [Aeternitas est ipsa Dei essentia, quatenus haec 
necessariam involvit existentiam] (by Definition 8 of Part I).”64 In this 
passage Spinoza appeals to the definition of eternity that appears at 
the opening of the Ethics:  “By eternity I understand existence itself, 
insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition alone 
of the eternal thing [Per aeternitatem intelligo ipsam existentiam, 
quatenus ex sola rei aeternae definitione necessario sequi concipi-
tur].”65 To this enigmatic definition, which apparently sins in obvious 
circularity (by employing the definiendum, “eternity,” in the defini-
ens), Spinoza attaches the following explanation: “For such existence, 
like the essence of a thing, is conceived as an eternal truth, and on that 
account cannot be explicated by duration or time, even if the duration 
is conceived to be without beginning or end [Talis enim existentia ut 
aeterna veritas, sicut rei essentia, concipitur, proptereaque per dura-
tionem aut tempus explicari non potest,66 tametsi duratio principio 
63 See Ethics, Part One, proposition 29, scholium.
64 Ethics, Part Five, proposition 30, demonstration. See Spinoza, Cogitata Metaphysica (=CM) 
II 1 (G I/ 251/ 11):  “The reasons why Writers have attributed duration to God. The reason why 
these Writers have erred is threefold: first, because they have attempted to explain eternity with-
out attending to God, as if eternity could be understood without contemplation of the divine 
essence— or as if it were something beyond the divine essence.” Italics added.
65 Ethics, Part One, Definition 8.
66 The recently discovered Vatican manuscript of Spinoza’s Ethics has here “nequit” instead of 
“non potest.” See Spinoza, The Vatican Manuscript of Spinoza’s “Ethics,” ed. Leen Spruit and Pina 
Totaro (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 84.
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et fine carere concipiatur].”67 In the existing literature there is some 
debate about Spinoza’s understanding of eternity, and of the related 
issue of mind eternity. Some scholars interpret Spinoza’s notion of 
eternity as mere sempiternity, or everlasting existence, while oth-
ers consider it atemporal.68 Although I  have significant reservations 
about both readings, I find the atemporal interpretation more accu-
rate. I will begin by registering that the primary meaning of aeternitas 
in Spinoza, as expressed in the official definition of the term in Ethics, 
part One, Definition 8, is explicitly contrasted with sempiternity or, 
in Spinoza’s words, with “duration [that] is conceived to be without 
beginning or end.”69 Indeed, Spinoza stresses several times that “in 
eternity, there is neither when, nor before, nor after.”70 Similarly, he 
argues, “we cannot ascribe future existence to God, because existence 
is of his essence.”71 Spinoza’s claim in Ethics, part One, definition 8, 
explanation, that eternity is existence “conceived as an eternal truth” 
provides further support for the rejection of the sempiternal reading, 
since he clearly regards eternal truths as not enduring: “No one will 
ever say that the essence of a circle or a triangle, insofar as it is an eter-
nal truth, has endured longer now than it had in the time of Adam.”72
67 Ethics, Part One, Definition 8, explanation. See CM II 1 (G I/ 252/ 17– 18): “I call this infinite 
existence eternity, which is to be attributed to God alone, and not to created things, even though its 
duration should be without beginning or end.” Italics added.
68 For the view of Spinoza’s eternity as mere sempiternity, see Martha Kneale, “Eternity and 
Sempiternity,” in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Marjorie Green (New York: Anchor 
Books, 1973), 227– 224, and Alan Donagan, Spinoza (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 
1988), 107– 113. The opposite, timeless reading of mind eternity, is advocated by Diane Steinberg, 
“Spinoza’s Theory of the Eternity of the Mind,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1981): 55– 65.
69 Even Kneale, who supports the sempiternal interpretation of mind eternity, concedes that the 
definition of eternity at the opening of the Ethics is not consistent with the sempiternal reading. 
It is only “by the time he came to write Part V,” claims Kneale, that Spinoza changed his view 
and “was thinking in a more Aristotelian way” (“Eternity and Sempiternity,” 238). Against Kneale 
I would argue that it would be very odd for Spinoza not to revise such a key definition in the Ethics, 
had he abandoned his original nondurational understanding of eternity.
70 Ethics, Part One, proposition 33, second scholium. See CM I 3 (G I/ 243/ 12): “In Eternity there 
is no when, not before, or after, nor any other affection of time.” See CM II 1 (G I/ 251/ 1). The last 
sentence is probably the closest Spinoza comes to the Boethian formula.
71 CM II 1 (G I/ 252/ 13).
72 CM II 1 (G I/ 250/ 29).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Jan 13 2016, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199781874.indd   153 1/13/2016   6:24:41 PM
154 Yitzhak Y. Melamed
The definition of eternity at the opening of the Ethics (and its 
explanation) clearly rules out any conception of eternity as limitless 
duration,73 but we should also pay close attention to the positive con-
tent of the definition. The definition not only tells us what eternity 
is— existence— but also tells what kind of existence it is— “existence 
itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the defini-
tion alone of the eternal thing”— that is, the existence of a thing whose 
existence follows necessarily from its own essence.74 Indeed, in Ethics, 
part One, proposition 23, scholium, Spinoza relies on his defini-
tion of eternity in order to identify eternity with the “necessity of 
existence” (necessitate existentiae) that each attribute of God is con-
ceived to express: “So if a mode is conceived to exist necessarily and 
be infinite, [its necessary existence and infinitude] must necessarily 
be inferred [concludi], or perceived through some attribute of God, 
insofar as that attribute is conceived to express infinity and necessity 
of existence, or (what is the same, by D8) eternity [quatenus idem con-
cipitur infinitatem, et necessitatem existentiae, sive (quod per Defin. 
8.  idem est) aeternitatem exprimere], i.e. (by D6 and P19), insofar as 
it is considered absolutely.”75 On two other occasions in the Ethics, 
Spinoza uses the phrase “eternity or [sive] necessity.” In Ethics, part 
One, proposition 10, scholium, Spinoza writes: “Nothing in nature is 
clearer than that each being must be conceived under some attribute, 
and the more reality, or being [realitatis, aut esse] it has, the more it 
has attributes which express necessity, or eternity [necessitatem, sive 
aeternitatem], and infinity.” Similarly, Ethics, part Four, proposition 
62, demonstration, reads:  “Whatever the Mind conceives under the 
73 See CM II 1 (G I/ 251/ 24) for Spinoza’s detailed critique of those who consider eternity “a species 
of duration” and do not distinguish between God’s eternity and the (infinite) duration of created 
things. I will shortly address the issue of the eternity of infinite modes.
74 The “conception of existence” in Ethics, Part One, Definition 8, must be adequate, for oth-
erwise, Spinoza’s proof in Ethics, Part one, proposition 19, demonstration— which relies on 
Definition 8— would be invalid. Thus, since eternity is existence, adequately conceived to follow 
from the definition of an eternal being, we may conclude that such existence indeed “follows from 
the definition alone of the eternal thing.”
75 Ethics, Part One, proposition 23, scholium. Italics added.
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guidance of reason, it conceives under the same species of eternity, 
or necessity [sub eadem aeternitatis, seu necessitatis specie concipit].” 
Almost always, Spinoza employs the Latin sive to designate equivalent 
terms, and the occurrences of the term in the above two passages are 
no exceptions. Thus, we have solid textual evidence showing that for 
Spinoza there is a very intimate relation between eternity and neces-
sity. Some commentators have suggested that Spinoza identifies eter-
nity with necessity, or necessary existence,76 but this qualification is 
imprecise and insufficient, since for Spinoza the existence of all things 
is necessary.77 What is truly unique to Spinoza’s notion of eternity is 
its being self- necessitated (or necessitated by virtue of its mere essence), 
whereas all other things are necessary by virtue of causes that are not 
identical with their essences.78 Here is Spinoza’s presentation of this 
crucial distinction: “A thing is called necessary either by reason of its 
essence or by reason of its cause. For a thing’s existence follows neces-
sarily either from its essence and definition or from a given efficient 
cause [Rei enim alicujus existentia vel ex ipsius essentia, et definitione, 
vel ex data causa efficiente necessario sequitur].”79 I will look closely 
at the second sentence of this passage. The notion of existence neces-
sarily following from the definition (and essence)80 of a thing should 
76 See, for example, Kneale, “Eternity and Sempiternity,” 235– 238, and B. Leftow, Time and 
Eternity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 63. Regrettably, these scholars are insensi-
tive to Spinoza’s important distinction between different kinds of necessary existence: necessary 
existence by virtue of one’s essence as opposed to necessary existence by virtue of one’s cause. See 
Ethics, Part One, proposition 33, scholium 1.
77 See Ethics, Part One, proposition 29, and Ethics, Part One, proposition 33. For an insightful dis-
cussion of Spinoza’s necessitarianism, see Don Garrett, “Spinoza’s Necessitarianism,” in God and 
Nature: Spinoza’s Metaphysics, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 97– 118. On the intimate 
connection between necessity and eternity in al- Kindī and Avicenna, see  chapter 2 here.
78 Herrera comes very close to identifying eternity with self- necessitated existence, claiming that 
what is “necessary by itself is, therefore, eternal.” Gate of Heaven, bk. 5, chap. 4 (Krabbenhoft trans., 
p. 150). For Spinoza’s adoption of the Maimonidean interpretation of “ego sum qui sum” (Exodus 
3:14) as indicating God’s self- necessitated existence, see my “Deification of Existence,” 83– 86.
79 Ethics, Part One, proposition 33, scholium 1.
80 For Spinoza, an adequate definition must capture the essence of the thing defined. See Tractatus 
de Intellectus Emendatione [Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect], section 95. As a result, he 
frequently treats the two terms as interchangeable.
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be familiar by now: this is just the definition of eternity in Ethics, part 
One, definition 8.  I  am coming close to excavating Spinoza’s under-
standing of eternity, but I am not yet there.
At this point it may be interesting to compare Spinoza’s and 
Boethius’s views of eternity. While both philosophers reject the 
conception of eternity as everlastingness, Spinoza, unlike Boethius, 
defines eternity without employing, or even referring to, the terminol-
ogy associated with duration and time (such as Boethius’s tota simul 
[all at once]). Only in the explication of his definition of eternity does 
Spinoza note that eternity cannot be equated with infinite duration, 
or time. This point is quite significant, since the role of a definition 
in Spinoza’s system is to capture the essence of a thing.81 Thus, it 
seems that for Spinoza, the essence of eternity is captured not by any 
relation— not even negation— to duration or time. Spinoza seems to be 
stressing this very point by noting that “eternity can neither be defined 
by time nor have any relation to time [nec aeternitas tempore definiri, 
nec ullam ad tempus relationem habere potest].”82 Instead, he pro-
poses a genuine definition of eternity as a unique kind of modality: self- 
necessitated existence. While quite a few of his predecessors associated 
eternity with necessity in one manner or another, he seems to go far 
beyond them in completely relocating this notion from the domain of 
temporality and defining it as a primarily a modal concept.83 This new 
understanding of eternity as self- necessitated existence may also shed 
light on the circularity in Spinoza’s definition of eternity (Ethics, part 
One, definition 8). Rather than a beginner’s error, it seems to be a pre-
meditated move attempting to capture the essential feature of eternity 
as self- necessitated.
81 See Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, section 95, and Ep. 9 (G IV/ 42/ 30).
82 Ethics, Part Five, proposition 23, scholium. Italics added.
83 Many of Spinoza’s predecessors affirmed the identity of essence and existence in God, but they 
did not see it as constituting God’s eternity. According to Gorham (“Descartes on God’s Relation 
to Time,” 422– 423), Descartes considered this identity compatible with God’s being in time, as he 
seamlessly moved, in the Fifth Meditation, from asserting the identity God’s essence and existence 
to ascribing temporality to God.
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Apart from the definition of eternity at the opening of the Ethics, 
the other key text for understanding Spinoza’s concept of eternity is 
Letter 12, famously known as the “Letter on the Infinite.” Spinoza 
circulated copies of this letter also in his very late period,84 and thus 
it seems to reflect his views during this time as well. In this difficult 
and intriguing text, Spinoza suggests a threefold distinction between 
eternity (aeternitas), duration (duratio) and time (tempus). In explain-
ing the distinction between the first two, Spinoza claims, “we conceive 
the existence of Substance to be entirely different from the existence 
of Modes. The difference between Eternity and Duration arises from 
this.85 For it is only of Modes that we can explicate [explicare possu-
mus]86 the existence by Duration. But [we can explicate the existence] 
of Substance by Eternity, i.e., the infinite enjoyment of existing, or (in 
bad Latin) of being [infinitam existendi, sive, invitâ latinitate, essendi 
fruitionem].”87 Spinoza’s use of the verb explicare in this passage may 
seem a bit odd. He is not looking here for an explanation of the causes 
of existence but is suggesting that existence can be explicated, or 
unfolded, as either duration or eternity. Eternity is the proper explica-
tion of the existence of substance, or the thing whose essence and exis-
tence are one and the same, while duration is the proper explication of 
the existence of modes, or things whose existence is distinct from their 
essence. A similar, though slightly different, distinction appears in a 
section titled “What Eternity Is; What Duration Is” in Spinoza’s early 
work the Cogitata Metaphysica:  “From our earlier division of being 
into being whose essence involves existence and being whose essence 
84 See Eps. 80 and 81.
85 For a detailed discussion of the bifurcation between eternity and duration and its sources, see 
my Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 105– 112.
86 I have altered Curley’s translation here, translating explicare as “explicate” instead of “explains.”
87 Ep. 12 (G IV/ 54/ 16– 55/ 3). Leibniz possessed a copy of this letter and annotated it. Commenting 
on the very last phrase in the foregoing passage, he writes: “This agrees well enough with Boethius’s 
definition of eternity” (Satis congruat cum definitions aeternitatis Boëtiana). See Leibniz, The 
Labyrinth of the Continuum:  Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672– 1686, trans. and ed. 
Richard T. W. Arthur (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 106– 107.
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involves only possible existence, there arises the distinction between 
eternity and duration.”88 In this early period (1663), Spinoza referred 
to the essence of modes as involving only possible existence, that is, 
being internally consistent. Later he will abandon the “involving only 
possible existence” terminology and instead claim that the essence of 
modes simply does not involve existence.
In another passage in the Cogitata Metaphysica Spinoza states the 
very same understanding of the nature of duration as the existence of 
modes in a critical note addressing certain unnamed opponents: “They 
have erred because they have ascribed duration to things only insofar 
as they judged them to be subject to continuous variation and not, as 
we do, insofar as their essence is distinguished from their existence.”89 
Whether modes are in some sense eternal is an important question that 
I will shortly address, but it is, I  think, clear that God’s existence is 
eternity, as defined in Ethics, part One, definition 8.
At this point we may wish to address a crucial problem. In proposi-
tions 21– 23 of part One of the Ethics, Spinoza lays out an outline of 
his theory of certain infinite entities that follow from the attributes. 
Scholars commonly refer to these entities as “the infinite modes,” 
though Spinoza never used the term. These are somewhat mysteri-
ous entities that appear in Spinoza’s work from a very early stage, yet, 
as far I can see, he never fully developed this theory.90 In the first of 
these three propositions he argues: “All things which follow from the 
absolute nature of any of God’s attributes have always had to exist 
and be infinite, or are through the same attribute, eternal and infi-
nite [Omnia, quae ex absoluta natura alicujus attributi Dei sequun-
tur, semper et infinita existere debuerunt, sive per idem attributum 
aeterna et infinita sunt].”91 The immediate infinite modes, as these 
88 CM I 4 (G I/ 244/ 13– 15). See H. F. Hallett, Aeternitas: A Spinozistic Study (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1930), 43– 44, for a helpful discussion of this and the previous passages.
89 CM II 1 (G I/ 251/ 17– 19). Italics added.
90 For a detailed discussion of the infinite modes, see  chapter 4 of my book Spinoza’s Metaphysics.
91 Ethics, Part One, proposition 21.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Jan 13 2016, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199781874.indd   158 1/13/2016   6:24:41 PM
 Eternity in Early Modern Philosophy 159
entities are commonly called,92 are described here as “eternal,” but this 
seems to conflict with Spinoza’s claims in the Letter on the Infinite 
that the existence of modes is duration, while eternity is the existence 
of substance.
Though the last point may at first look like a blunt contradiction, we 
can sort it out if we pay attention to the following observations. First, 
the phrase in Ethics, part One, proposition 21, that asserts that infi-
nite modes “have always had to exist” (semper … existere debuerunt) 
is more consistent with an everlasting, as opposed to atemporal, 
understanding of eternity.93 Second, the demonstration of the afore-
mentioned proposition does not show (or even attempt to show) that 
infinite modes are eternal in the strict sense of Ethics, part One, defi-
nition 8, but only shows that these modes “cannot have a determinate 
duration [non potest determinatam habere durationem].”94 This obvi-
ously allows for the infinite modes to have indeterminate (or infinite) 
duration. Nowhere in this demonstration does Spinoza prove, or even 
attempt to prove, that infinite modes are atemporal. Since Spinoza 
was acutely aware of the distinction between endless duration and 
atemporality (recall my discussion of Ethics, part One. definition 8, 
explanation) it would be very odd for him to state one thesis and prove 
the other.
Third, the demonstration of Ethics, part One, proposition 21, does 
not at all mention Spinoza’s official definition of eternity as atempo-
ral self- necessitated existence (Ethics, part One, definition 8). Were 
Spinoza to argue that the immediate infinite modes are eternal in the 
strict sense of Ethics, part One, definition 8, the first thing he should 
92 Immediate infinite modes are modes that follow directly from the nature of an attribute (see 
Ethics, Part One, proposition 21, demonstration). A mediate infinite mode is a mode that follows 
from the attribute only through the mediation of another infinite mode (see Ethics, Part One, 
propositions 22 and 23).
93 This point is also stressed by Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, 2  vols. 
(New York: Schocken, 1969), vol. 1, 377. Another commentator who qualifies the eternity of infi-
nite modes (in Ethics, Part One, proposition 21) unlike the eternity of substance, as mere everlast-
ingness, is Martial Gueroult, Spinoza: Dieu (Ethique 1) (Paris: Aubier, 1968), 309.
94 Ethics, part One, proposition 21, demonstration (G II/ 66/ 13). Italics added.
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do would be to appeal to the definition of eternity.95 Spinoza does 
mention the definition of eternity in his discussion of the infinite 
modes in Ethics, part One, proposition 23, demonstration, and one 
might be tempted to consider this evidence that the infinite modes 
are eternal in the strict sense of Ethics, part One, definition 8. Yet, on 
closer examination, we should notice that in the demonstration of 
proposition 23, when Spinoza invokes definition 8, he does so in order 
to identify eternity with “an attribute of God … insofar as it is consid-
ered absolutely”;96 but this last characterization is clearly not true of the 
infinite modes, which “ follow from the absolute nature of any of God’s 
attributes” but are not this absolute nature itself.
Finally, we have clear evidence that Spinoza recognized a certain 
“second best” notion of eternity— eternity as everlastingness— as long 
as it is not applied to God (who is eternal in the strict sense of [atempo-
ral] self- necessitated existence). Consider the following passage from 
the Cogitata Metaphysica:
So we pass to the second question and ask whether what has been 
created could have been created from eternity.
What is denoted here by the words: from eternity
To understand the question rightly, we must attend to this man-
ner of speaking: “from eternity.” For by this we wish to signify here 
something altogether different from what we explained previously 
when we spoke of God’s eternity. Here we understand nothing but 
a duration without any beginning of duration, or a duration so great 
that, even if we wished to multiply it by many years, or tens of thou-
sands of years, and this product in turn by tens of thousands, we 
could still never express it by any number, however large.97
95 Spinoza invokes Ethics, Part One, Definition 8, in almost all places where he proves the eternity 
of anything.
96 Italics added.
97 CM I 10 (G I/ 270/ 17– 25).
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In this passage Spinoza introduces a certain notion of eternity that is 
“altogether different” from God’s eternity. Unlike God’s eternity as 
self- necessitated existence, the “second best” eternity, which belongs 
only to created things, is identified with unlimited duration. Notice 
that Spinoza stresses that the “manner of speaking” that employs the 
expression “from eternity” (ab aeterno) indicates that what is at stake 
is the “second best” eternity of created things (i.e., everlastingness). 
In the following passage from the Short Treatise, Spinoza applies this 
very expression explicitly to the immediate infinite modes: “Turning 
now to universal Natura naturata, or those modes or creatures which 
immediately depend on, or have been created by God … we say, then, 
that these have been created from all eternity and will remain to all 
eternity, immutable, a work as great as the greatness of the workman.”98 
We have, I believe, very strong evidence that the eternity of the infi-
nite modes (even of the immediate infinite modes) is, unlike God’s 
eternity, merely everlastingness. Spinoza stresses in several places that 
eternity truly belongs only to God.99 Arguably, in all these places he is 
speaking of eternity in its strict sense (of Ethics, part One, definition 
8), which completely excludes duration and time.
I have just clarified one exception to Spinoza’s key claim in the Letter 
on the Infinite that the existence of God must be explicated through 
eternity, while the existence of modes should be explicated as dura-
tion, that is, we have seen that the infinite modes may be described as 
“eternal” but only in the inferior sense of the term as mere everlast-
ingness. But Spinoza allows for another— and bolder— exception (or 
apparent exception) to his dichotomy between the existence of modes 
and existence of substance. In several places in the Ethics, Spinoza 
98 Korte Verhandeling van God de Mensch en deszelfs Welstand [Short Treatise on God, Man, and 
his Well- Being] 1.9 (G I/ 48/ 3– 9). Italics added. “From eternity to eternity” is also a translation of 
the Hebrew of Psalms 106:48 (Min ha- Olam ve- ad ha- Olam).
99 “And I  call this infinite existence Eternity, which is to be attributed to God alone, and not 
to any created thing, even though its duration should be without beginning or end” (CM II 1 [G 
I/ 252/ 17– 19]). See Spinoza’s critique of those who think that eternity is “something beyond the 
divine essence” (CM II 1 [G I/ 252/ 11]).
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suggests that modes, even finite modes, may be adequately conceived as 
eternal, or sub specis aeternitatis.100 I will turn now to examine briefly 
two important texts in which Spinoza develops this claim.
In proposition 45 of part Two of the Ethics, Spinoza argues: “Each 
idea of each body, or of each singular thing which actually exists, nec-
essarily involves an eternal and infinite essence of God.” To this prop-
osition he adduces the following scholium:
By existence here I do not understand duration, i.e., existence inso-
far as it is conceived abstractly, and as a certain species of quantity. 
For I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is attributed 
to singular things because infinitely many things follow from the eter-
nal necessity of God’s nature in infinitely many modes (see IP16). I am 
speaking, I say, of the very existence of singular things insofar as they are 
in God. For even if each one is determined by another singular thing 
to exist in a certain way, still the force by which each one perseveres in 
existing follows from the eternal necessity of God’s nature.101
For Spinoza, “singular things” (res singulares) are just the finite 
modes,102 but strikingly Spinoza says here that if we conceive finite 
modes nonabstractly— that is, as completely imbedded in the 
substance— we can attribute to them “the very nature of existence,” 
which is not duration but the very eternity of God. The reason for this 
bold claim is simple: when we conceive modes “insofar as they are in 
God,” that is, as completely imbedded in God, we really conceive noth-
ing but God, and God is eternal in the strict sense of self- necessitation.
The very same point is raised again toward the end of the Ethics, 
where Spinoza discusses the mind’s eternity. When the human mind 
100 See Ethics, Part Two, proposition 44, corollary, and Part Five, propositions 22, 30, and 31.
101 Ethics, Part Two, proposition 45, scholium. Italics added.
102 See Ethics, Part Two, Definition 7: “By singular things I understand things that are finite and 
have a determinate existence.”
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and body— two finite modes— are conceived as strictly flowing from 
God’s essence, they take part in the very eternity of God. Thus, the 
30th proposition of part Five of the Ethics and its demonstration read:
Insofar as our Mind knows itself and the Body under a species of 
eternity, it necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows that it is 
in God and is conceived through God.
Demonstration: Eternity is the very essence of God insofar as this 
involves necessary existence (by ID8). To conceive things under a 
species of eternity, therefore, is to conceive things insofar as they 
are conceived through God’s essence, as real beings, or insofar as 
through God’s essence they involve existence. Hence, insofar as our 
Mind conceives itself and the Body under a species of eternity, it 
necessarily has knowledge of God, and knows, etc., q.e.d.
Notice the italicized phrase in this passage. When the human mind 
and body are conceived through God’s essence, they thereby involve 
the existence which is God’s essence, that is, eternity. Here again, when 
the mind conceives itself (and its body) as completely imbedded in 
God, it really conceives God, the strictly eternal being.103 Now, we 
can make sense of an intriguing note of Spinoza in the Letter on the 
Infinite. Note carefully the “insofar” clause:104 “I call the Affections of 
Substance Modes. Their definition, insofar as it is not the very defini-
tion of Substance, cannot involve any existence.”105 When we conceive 
the modes as completely imbedded in the substance, they are defined 
through the substance, and to that extent their definition involves 
existence, that is, they are eternal.
103 For further discussion of Spinoza’s understanding of mind eternity, see Hallett, 
Aeternitas, 72– 98.
104 In a marginal note on the “insofar” clause, Leibniz asks: “So can the definition of a mode be 
the definition of substance in some manner?” (Labyrinth of the Continuum, 105). The demonstra-
tion of proposition 30 of Part Five of the Ethics indicates that the answer to this question is positive.
105 Spinoza, Ep. 12 (G IV/ 54/ 9– 11). Italics added.
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5 The Reception of Spinoza’s Concept of Eternity 
as Self- Necessitated Existence
Leibniz was no fan of Spinoza. He visited Spinoza once in November 
1676 and was clearly impressed.106 They also shared a close friend, Baron 
Ehrenfried Walter von Tschirnhaus (1651– 1708). But Leibniz was a 
Christian philosopher, and Spinoza was not. The late Leibniz was also 
highly suspicious of Spinoza’s attempt to speak in the language of main-
stream theology. Thus, in a 1707 note he remarks that Spinoza’s talk 
about “the intellectual love of God” (amor dei intellectualis) is “nothing 
but soap to the masses.107 Earlier, in the 1686 Discourse on Metaphysics, 
Leibniz writes disparagingly about “the recent innovators who hold that 
the beauty of the universe and the goodness we attribute to the works 
of God are but the chimeras of those who conceive of God in terms of 
themselves.”108 Spinoza was clearly the direct target of this critique.
In light of this clear opposition to Spinoza, we might be surprised by 
Leibniz’s unreserved adoption of Spinoza’s understanding of eternity. The 
person whom many contemporary Europeans took to be the paragon of 
atheism tuned out to be the foremost expert on eternity, that is, God’s 
essence. In 1678 Leibniz received a copy of Spinoza’s Opera Posthuma, 
shortly after its publication. Leibniz’s notes on the first few definitions of 
part One of the Ethics are quite critical. Yet when he comes to definition 
7 (“That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its nature 
alone”),109 and what is more important for this discussion, definition 8 
(i.e., Spinoza’s definition of eternity), Leibniz notes: “I approve of both of 
these definitions.”110 Along the same lines, in his New Essays on God on 
106 See my Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 27– 28, and 167– 168. For illuminating discussions of Leibniz’s 
friendship with Tschirnhaus, see Christia Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 408– 409, and Mogens Laerke, Leibniz lecteur de 
Spinoza: La genese d’une opposition complexe (Paris: Honoré champion, 2008), 362– 373.
107 Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 281.
108 Discourse on Metaphysics, section 2, in Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 36.
109 For a helpful discussion of Leibniz’s reception of Spinoza’s understanding of divine freedom, 
see Laerke, Leibniz lecteur de Spinoza, 834– 843.
110 Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. and trans. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht: Reidel, 
1969), 197.
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Human Understanding, Theophilius, the Leibnizian interlocutor in the 
dialogue, rejects the view of eternity as infinite duration and identifies it 
instead with “the necessity of God’s existence.”111
A particularly interesting passage in which Leibniz allows— just like 
Spinoza— for eternity to have more than one sense yet insists that the 
more precise sense of the term is “necessity of existence” is the follow-
ing: “Eternity, if it is conceived as something which is homogenous with 
time, will be unlimited time; but if it is conceived as the attribute of 
something eternal, it will be duration through an unlimited time. But 
the true origin and the inmost nature of eternity is the very necessity of 
existing, which does not of itself indicate any succession, even if it should 
happen that what is eternal coexists with everything…. Eternity per se 
does not indicate succession.”112 Samuel Clarke, with whom Leibniz had 
a celebrated exchange of letters, seems also to adopt Spinoza’s notion of 
eternity as self- necessitated existence. Thus, in his 1704 Demonstration of 
the Being and Attributes of God, Clarke states the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason and then turns to equate eternity with existence that is neces-
sitated by the nature of the thing. “Whatever exists has a cause, a reason, 
a ground for its existence, a foundation on which its existence relies, a 
ground or reason why it does exist rather than not exists, either in the 
necessity of its own nature (and then it must have been of itself eternal), or 
in the will of some other being.”113 Later, in the very same work, Clarke 
notes: “The ideas of eternity and self- existence are so closely connected, 
that because something must of necessity be eternal independently and 
111 Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, translated and edited by Peter Remnant and 
Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1981), chap.  17, sec. 18. Two recent 
commentators who stress the influence of Spinoza on Leibniz’s concept of eternity are Michael 
J.  Futch (Leibniz’s Metaphysics of Time and Space [Berlin:  Springer:  2008], 191), and Vailati 
(Leibniz and Clarke, 19).
112 Leibniz, De Summa Rerum, translated by G.H.R. Parkinson (New Haven:  Yale University 
Press, 1992), 41 (Ak. 6.3.484). Italics added. See Leibniz, De Summa Rerum 396 (Ak. 6.3.159): “But 
absolute existence is eternity or necessity. From this it immediately follows that such a being does 
not only exist, but also exists necessarily.”
113 Clarke, Demonstration, 8. The curious phrase “necessity of its own nature” seems to be bor-
rowed from proposition 16 of Part One of Spinoza’s Ethics: “From the necessity of the divine nature 
there must follow infinitely many thing in infinitely many modes.”
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without any outward cause, of its being, therefore it must necessarily be 
self- existing.”114 The view of eternity as mere everlastingness will become 
more and more popular throughout the eighteenth century.115 In his 
highly influential Metaphysics, Alexander Baumgarten (1714– 1762) will 
mostly adopt the conception of eternity as everlastingness, though his 
definition of eternity will change from one edition to another, and occa-
sionally one could still trace echoes of Spinoza’s definition.116
Close to the end of the century, Moses Mendelssohn (1729– 1786) 
will write the following in his 1785 Morgenstunden (Morning Hours), a 
work that is partly directed against Spinoza but still echoes his defini-
tion of eternity as self- necessitated existence: “We must admit the sort 
of beginning of things that is in need of no further beginning, hence, 
a necessary being, whose existence does not depend upon efficient 
causes, whose duration however is not a temporal succession without 
beginning but instead a timelessness, an immutable eternity that can 
essentially have neither beginning, nor progression, nor end… . The 
necessary being has, like all the necessary truths of geometry, no past 
and no future time…. The immutable necessary substance is at once 
everything that can be thought of it, and its existence knows neither 
increase not decrease.”117 One of Mendelssohn’s major literary (and 
political) projects was the translation of the Bible into German. Here, 
when he faced the question of how to translate the Tetragrammaton— 
the holiest divine name, which both Maimonides and Spinoza inter-
preted as indicating God’s self- necessitated existence,118 he settled on 
114 Clarke, Demonstration, 31. It should be noted that for Clarke, unlike Spinoza, the self- 
necessitated, or eternal, being is everlasting (Demonstration, 32).
115 At the beginning of this chapter we encountered Newton’s claim that it is more agreeable to 
reason to interpret God’s eternity as the view condensed in the Tetragrammaton, i.e., “He that was 
and is and is to come.” See note 8 here.
116 Thus, in sec. 303 of the first edition, we read:  “a necessary being and substance, an infinite 
being, is eternal.” See Alexander Baumgarten, Metaphysics, trans. Courtney D. Fugate and John 
Hymers (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 424 n. 358.
117 Moses Mendelssohn, Morning Hours: Lectures on God’s Existence, trans. Daniel O. Dahlstorm 
and Corey Dyck (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), chap. 11, pp. 67– 68.
118 See my “Deification of Existence,” 81– 86.
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Der Ewige (the eternal).119 Whether he had the claims of Maimonides 
and Spinoza in mind I will leave for the reader to decide.
Abbreviations
AT René Descartes, Oeuvres, 11 vols., ed. Charles Adam and Paul 
Tannery, new CNRS ed. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1974– 86). Cited by vol-
ume and page number: “AT VII 23” stands for vol. 7, p. 23 of this 
edition.
CSM Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch (eds. and trans.), The 
Philosophical Writings of Descartes. 3 vols. (third volume edited 
also by A. Kenny). Cited by volume and page number: “CSM II 
233” stands for vol. 2, p. 233 of this edition.
CM Benedict Spinoza, Cogitata Metaphysica [Metaphysical 
thoughts], an appendix to Spinoza, Renati des Cartes 
Principiorum Philosophiae Pars I & II [Descartes’s Principles of 
Philosophy] (1663). Cited by part and chapter: “CM 1 10” stands 
for part 1,  chapter 10 of this work.
Ep. Spinoza’s Letters
G Benedict Spinoza, Spinoza Opera, ed. Carl Gebhardt, 4  vols. 
(Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925). Cited by volume, page, and line 
number: “G II/ 200/ 12” stands for vol. 2, p. 200, l. 12 of this edition.
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